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ENGINEERING COMPETITIVE POLICY AND
COPYRIGHT MISUSE
Marshall Leaffer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the copyright misuse doctrine prohibit attempts by software
owners to impede others from reverse engineering software to develop
non-infringing competing or compatible software? This issue is particu-
larly important after Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,' which
held that reverse engineering for purposes of developing non-infringing
competing or compatible software is a fair use of copyrighted software.
In a comprehensive and well-articulated opinion, the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized the fundamental importance of reverse engineering through
disassembly and decompilation to develop non-infringing and compati-
ble programs.'
Although reverse engineering is permissible in other areas of intel-
lectual property law,3 when a software program is reverse engineered,
copyright infringement may occur at several stages of the process. For
example, to enhance his ability to analyze the program's ideas and
structure, a programmer may wish to translate object code' into source
code,5 thus facilitating analysis. This process requires the making of
several copies of the program and implicates the issue of copyright in-
* Eugene Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A.
1964, University of Texas; M.A. 1967, University of Illinois; J.D. 1971, University of Texas
School of Law; L.L.M. 1977, New York University.
1. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
2. It is significant that the European Community (EC) directive, Article 6 on Computer
Software would allow reverse engineering to produce interoperable programs under certain cir-
cumstances. See Vanessa Marsland, Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Software -
An EC/UK Perspective, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1021 (1994); Jaap H. Spoor, Copyright Protection
and Reverse Engineering of Software: Implication and Effects of the EC Directive, 19 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 1063 (1994). Sega goes somewhat further in allowing reverse engineering and inter-
mediate copying for the purpose of producing non-infringing programs.
3. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 906 (1988). This section of
the Act authorizes the copying of the mask work on a silicon chip in the course of reverse engi-
neering the chip.
4. Object code is machine language that a computer can recognize and execute through the
computer's Central Processing Unit (CPU). See BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, QUE'S COMPUTER
USER'S DICTIONARY, 424 (3d ed. 1992). The language is symbolized by O's and l's and is ex-
tremely difficult to use and read. Id.
5. Source code may be defined as a high-level programming language, intelligible to pro-
grammers, which is then compiled or interpreted into machine instructions (object code) so that
the computer can execute them. Id. at 565.
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fringement.6 Despite the obvious infringement of the copyright owner's
reproduction right, the court in Sega found reverse engineering a fair
use of the targeted software; this use fundamentally supports the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts. 7
The tension between software owners and those wishing to unlock
a program's secrets through reverse engineering is not new. Even before
Sega, software owners had used both legal and technological means to
discourage reverse engineering. These have run the gamut from license
agreements prohibiting reverse engineering to technological impedi-
ments inserted into software and designed to render the reverse engi-
neer's task more difficult. This perennial battle between owners and
those wishing access will increase in intensity.8 In this Article, I predict
that software owners will show a renewed interest in deterring reverse
engineering after Sega. The question presented is whether such at-
tempts to impede reverse engineering constitute copyright misuse and a
defense to an action for copyright infringement, now that intermediate
copying for reverse engineering purposes to produce a compatible or
non-infringing program is a fair use. Although the same conduct may
raise antitrust issues,9 this Article will focus its discussion on the de-
fense of copyright misuse. If the misuse defense is a viable defense, and
this is by no means certain, it will enjoy more universal applicability
than an antitrust counterclaim. Why would the copyright misuse de-
fense be more attractive to litigants if the same commercial conduct
may raise both antitrust and misuse issues? The reason lies in major
differences in their scope and application. Unlike an antitrust counter-
6. Richard H. Stern, An Ill-Conceived Analysis of Reverse Engineering of Software as
Copyright Infringement: Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 407
(1992).
7. Unlike the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA), which specifically recognizes an
affirmative defense of reverse engineering, the Copyright Act does not explicitly incorporate a
reverse engineering privilege. Under § 906(a)(1) and (2) of the SCPA, developers can "reproduce
the mask work solely for the purpose of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or tech-
niques embodied in the mask work" and "incorporate the results of such conduct in an original
mask work which is made to be distributed." 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(l)-(2) (1988); see also Leo J.
Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REv. 385 (1985).
8: This is true, at least in the short run. In this constantly changing industry, the same
companies that may wish to impede access may want to gain access to others' programs. Thus, the
Segas of the world may trade places with the Accolades in needing reverse engineering for pur-
poses of compatibility. If that occurs, reverse engineering will become an industry norm to an even
greater extent than it is today, and the incentive to sue for such activities will diminish.
9. Of course, antitrust has an important role to play in establishing the competitive relation-
ships in any. industry, particularly in an industry like that of video game platforms in which the
market is dominated by two participants. If the relevant market were to be defined in such a
manner, exclusionary conduct on the part of a company like Sega would raise issues of monopoli-
zation and attempted monopolization. See generally, 3 AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
§§ 814-15 (1978).
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claim, the copyright misuse defense is a per se violation, since it avoids
the uncertainties and difficulties involved in proving that a restraint is
unreasonable under the antitrust laws.10 Until the 1990 Fourth Circuit
opinion in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,1 the misuse defense
had received almost no recognition in copyright law, in contrast to its
long and tortured history in patent litigation. This relatively obscure
doctrine, based on quasi-antitrust and unclean hands principles, may
attract new interest as owners of software copyrights try to erect con-
tractual and technological barriers to reverse engineering.
Before discussing copyright misuse, I will present a brief overview
of reverse engineering's important role in software development and its
place in other branches of intellectual property law. Whether the mis-
use defense is applicable against these attempts by software owners will
depend on whether reverse engineering, particularly through decompi-
lation and disassembly, is the only feasible way in which a software
developer may have access to the fundamental ideas, structures, and
processes embodied in many software programs. In short, whether
copyright misuse applies to anti-reverse engineering measures will de-
pend on the solidity of Sega's fair use justification of reverse engineer-
ing allowing certain forms of copying despite the appearance of copy-
right infringement.
II. REVERSE ENGINEERING IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE: COMPETITIVE
CONCERNS
A. Reverse Engineering in General
Described as software archaeology, reverse engineering is the pro-
cess of taking a finished product and working backwards to discover
how it works. Reverse engineers must extract the software's functional-
ity (what it does) from its design (how it does it). They accomplish this
task by analyzing the software's programming code, data structures,
files, and databases. Reverse engineering is performed by translating
the unreadable object code of a program into more accessible source
code. This decompilation or disassembly process is often accomplished
automatically by special translation programs. Although there are
other less controversial methods of reverse engineering that do not re-
quire one to copy aspects of the underlying program, the translation
processes of decompilation and disassembly, by definition, necessitate
varying degrees of interim copying. Pervasively used in the computer
industry, these processes have become an industry norm.
10. Id.
11. 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
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The issue of reverse engineering is of particular importance for
computer software because of its uniqueness when compared with older
forms of copyrightable subject matter. Despite being categorized under
the Copyright Act as literary works, 2 computer software differs signifi-
cantly from other copyrighted works enumerated in section 102 of the
statute. Unlike other copyrighted works, computer programs are not
immediately intelligible to the reader, viewer, or listener. To develop
either competitive or compatible products, interim copying into an in-
telligible medium may therefore be necessary to study a program's se-
quence and logic."
In this savagely competitive and rapidly developing industry, the
practice of making interim copies through decompilation and disassem-
bly techniques has become an industry standard. The reason for the
widespread adoption of reverse engineering techniques relates to the
way in which software is developed and its accessibility to human com-
prehension as it progresses from source code to machine-readable lan-
guage. Most computer programs are written first in "source code," a
natural language understandable to programmers that uses a combina-
tion of words and arithmetic expressions. Once the program has been
written in source code, it is translated into machine-readable code. This
step is known as "compilation," and the resulting "object code" is
largely unintelligible even to the skilled programmer.' 4 Many software
owners distribute their software only as object code. One who wants to
study the ideas embodied in the program cannot do so directly from the
object code. To perceive these ideas, one must first reverse engineer the
object code into source code. Here, the object code must be "decom-
piled" to produce source code. The decompilation process generally re-
quires making copies of the original copy. Once the object code is
decompiled into source code, a skilled programmer can easily analyze
the code, the objective of which is to develop compatible or competing
software.
Prohibition of reverse engineering through decompilation would
erect a serious obstacle to developers who legitimately desire to create
compatible software, which many would argue is essential to innovation
12. 17 U.S.C § 102 (a)(l) (1988). Literary works are defined as "works, other than audio-
visual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, re-
gardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, pho-
norecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
13. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BAL-
ANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CHANGE 146 (1992) [hereinafter FINDING A BALANCE].
14. This process is described in detail in Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engi-
neering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 843 (1994).
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in the computer industry. 15 It is possible for a programmer to engage in
reverse engineering without making an interim copy of the target pro-
gram. This may be accomplished by executing the program and exam-
ining its external attributes, or even by obtaining information about the
program from published specifications, manuals, and standards docu-
ments." In practice, however, copies are made at several stages of the
process because the alternative method of examining code on a com-
puter screen is not feasible. Prohibiting a programmer from analyzing
hundreds of pages of code in paper form would be the death knell of
effective reverse engineering in many circumstances, increasing its cost
to the point of unfeasibility. Sega engrafted these assumptions about
the necessity of reverse engineering into copyright law through the doc-
trine of fair use.
B. Sega, Fair Use, and the Underlying Policies of Copyright Law
The Sega case places itself squarely in a long line of copyright
cases that attempt to adapt copyright to the challenge of the new tech-
nologies by applying the infinitely malleable defense of fair use.17 Fair
use has been used by the courts as a means to fashion competitive pol-
icy in certain copyright industries. Unfortunately, the "fair use" de-
fense can be an unsatisfactory tool when improperly applied. One thing
is certain, however: A finding of fair use or lack thereof in a critical
case may define the competitive relationships for an entire industry. As
a result, most courts applying the doctrine have ultimately found fair
use, opting for dissemination of the copyrighted material. Courts tend
to avoid a contrary finding (lack of fair use and infringement) that
would risk suppressing a new, developing technology. This hands off
15. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature of innova-
tion in computer technology.
16. Duncan H. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1037,
1077 (1986).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1992). Section 107 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106(A), the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
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attitude is consistent with the traditional role of the judiciary. This role
is simply to decide disputes between two parties. By comparison, the
courts have had a long-standing reluctance to involve themselves in reg-
ulatory decrees that entail setting up institutional mechanisms to en-
force a given remedy. The Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 8 and Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States9 cases
provide good examples of this judicial reluctance. In both cases, the
courts found that the defendant engaged in fair use, thereby allowing
customary practices in the video recording and photocopying industries.
By finding fair use, these courts avoided intrusive piecemeal judicial
regulation of a new technology. In similar fashion, the Sega court took
a constrained approach, finding fair use where the contrary would over-
ride entrenched industry practices.
. Copyright may be defined as a system of intangible property rights
that balances the interests of authors to control and exploit their writ-
ings with society's competing interests in the free flow of ideas and in-
formation."0 In its most general dimension, a properly working copy-
right law would optimize the production and dissemination of works of
authorship. The Copyright Act encourages production of works of au-
thorship by rewarding authors with exclusive rights to control access to
their work."' At the same time, the Act allows access (or one might say
encourages dissemination) to the work by subjecting these rights to cer-
tain limitations.22
The most global limitation on copyright protection resides in the
idea expression principle. Succinctly stated, copyright does not protect
ideas per se, but the way in which those ideas are expressed. This fun-
damental principle is embodied in section 102(b) of the Act, precluding
protection for idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery.23 The public is free to use these funda-
mental building blocks necessary to produce other works in both the
artistic and scientific realms.
The other major limitation to copyright protection is found in the
privilege of fair use. Prudently applied, fair use fine tunes the optimiza-
tion of creation and dissemination of information. In so doing, it har-
monizes the underlying goals of copyright. Similarly, the doctrine of
fair use as codified in section 107 allows access for certain limited pur-
poses that would support the progress of science and the useful arts.
18. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19. 187 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
20. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429-30.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
22. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120.
23. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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The subject matter limitation of section 102(b) and the fair use
privilege of section 107 were the bases for the Sega court's finding that
Accolade's reverse engineering of Sega's software did not constitute an
infringement of copyright. In Sega, Accolade decompiled Sega's video
game programs to develop game cartridges compatible with Sega's
"Genesis" video entertainment system. 2' In rejecting Sega's action for
infringement, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the Copyright Act per-
mits an individual in rightful possession of a copy of a work to under-
stand the work's ideas, processes, and methods of operation.28 The
court found this permission to reside in the defense of fair use.26
The defendant, Accolade, an independent developer of video game
cartridges, purchased Sega game cartridges and generated printouts of
the Sega source code by running the Sega object code through a
"decompiler. '2 7 Its reverse engineering efforts eventually enabled Acco-
lade to produce a compatible cartridge. 28 The Ninth Circuit held that
although this kind of interim copying constituted copyright infringe-
ment, the copying was privileged as a fair use." In reviewing the enu-
merated factors,30 the court focused on the nature of the copyrighted
work.31 The court referred to the hybrid nature of computer programs,
where there is no settled standard for distinguishing protected expres-
sion from unprotected idea. If disassembly were an unfair use per se,
the copyright owner would have a de facto monopoly over the func-
tional aspects of the work. Such a monopoly would face the more strin-
gent standards of patent law. Because Sega's video games contained
unprotected aspects that could not be examined without copying, the
court determined that the games must be afforded a lower degree of
protection than more traditional literary works.
After Sega, intermediate copying is a fair use if it is necessary to
understand the ideas and processes embodied in the work. When this
issue arises, section 107 of the Copyright Act requires the court to
scrutinize the nature of the work to determine if reproduction is a fair
24. 977 F.2d 1510, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993).
25. Id. at 1520.
26. Id. at 1517.
27. Id. at 1515.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1517.
30. See supra note 17.
31. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523. The court also found that the first factor, the purpose and
character of the use, was in Accolade's favor because any commercial exploitation was indirect
and derivative. Id. at 1522. The fourth factor, effect of the copying on the potential market,
favored Accolade as well because it was a use that merely enabled the copier to enter the market
for works of the same type as the copied work. The factor in Sega's favor was the amount and
substantiality of the copying which included wholesale copying, but this was given little weight
since the ultimate use was limited. Id.
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use. Disassembly of object code to discern the unprotected ideas in a
computer program is a fair use promoting science and the useful arts
when done to create other non-infringing or compatible works.32 The
fair use privilege applied in this way recognizes the unique attributes of
computer software. It keeps an author from acquiring patent-like pro-
tection by putting an idea, process, or method of operation in an
unintelligible format and asserting copyright infringement against
those who try to understand that idea. One might interpret Sega as
preventing the software owner from extending his property right be-
yond the terms of the boundaries provided by copyright law.33 The
Sega court suggested a similar idea stating, "[Sega's] attempt to mo-
nopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs
counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and
cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of
the fair use doctrine." ' Thus, Sega is permeated with anti-monopoly
rhetoric.35 Although the court did not expressly raise the issue of copy-
right misuse, it was clearly troubled by Sega's attempt to control access
to the work and thereby defeat the purposes of copyright.
When Sega is read in this manner, the following question may be
posed: Do software owners overstep the boundaries of the copyright
grant when they prevent or inordinately raise the costs of reverse engi-
neering and intermediate copying through contractual or technological
impediments? Stated this way, the issue of copyright misuse is raised.
The elusive doctrine of copyright misuse, since the 1990 Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds" case, has enjoyed a modest revival. But to
determine whether copyright misuse has a renewed role to play, the
doctrine must be reexamined in its better known application as a de-
fense to an action for patent infringement.
C. Computer Software: A Cumulative Technology
By giving a green light to the most effective kind of reverse engi-
neering, one that involves interim copying, the author believes that
32. Arthur Miller has argued that allowing decompilation places an enormous burden on
the program copyright owner to discover and prove infringement, particularly under the Altai
approach of proving substantial similarity. See Arthur Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU, 106
HARV. L. REV. 977, 1027 (1992).
33. Sega accomplished by case law what the European Economic Community Directive on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs accomplished by permitting one to copy information
necessary to achieve interoperability. See Linda G. Morrison, The EC Directive on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs: Does It Leave Room for Reverse Engineering Beyond the
Need for Interoperability?, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 293 (1992).
34. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
35. Id.
36. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Sega at least implicitly stands for certain assumptions about rapidly
changing, technologically driven industries such as the computer
software industry. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion pro-
vides a dramatic attempt by a court, using copyright law, to pattern the
competitive relationships in the computer software field. The Sega
court was reluctant to hinder industry practices that built on the accu-
mulated knowledge of prior software developers to facilitate production
of non-infringing programs. The court's attitude about the computer
software industry is consistent with current notions about the way pro-
gress occurs in rapidly developing technologies.
Computer software may be characterized as a "cumulative tech-
nology," an attribute it shares with other rapidly developing areas of
technology. In "cumulative technology" industries, future advances
build incrementally on previous recent developments. In areas of rap-
idly moving cumulative technologies, a copyright court is faced with a
dilemma: If protection is given too broad a scope, it may retard the
advancement of innovation in an industry (like the software industry)
in which innovation proceeds through sequential development."7 Many
economists would agree that getting technology to the market sooner
will raise consumer welfare and encourage further development of new
generations of products, particularly in industries with cumulative tech-
nological characteristics. 8 The ability to readily engage in reverse engi-
neering promotes cumulative innovation by adding incremental value to
the succeeding product, reducing development costs, and accelerating
further innovation. 9 By allowing reverse engineers to build on previous
developments, the Sega court implicitly adopted this vision of techno-
logical progress.' 0
37. See generally Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989); David S. Victor, Note, Factor, Analysis of
an Affirmative Defense for Reverse Engineering Within a System of Legal Protection for Com-
puter Software, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1993).
38. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Pat-
ent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
39. Suzanne Schotmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991). The Sega court came close to recognizing the
cumulative innovation principles finding that an "increase in the number of independently
designed video game programs" was a "growth in creative expression," precisely the objective of
the Copyright Act. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
40. As such, Sega does not reflect a technophobic tendency among the judiciary as Anthony
Clapes has argued. See Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia,
Law and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 903 (1994). Rather, its approach
favors dissemination of technology in an industry that thrives on the latest incremental
developments.
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D. Erecting Barriers to Reverse Engineering
Assuming the legal principles set forth in Sega are firmly
grounded and will be adopted by circuits other than the Ninth Cir-
cuit,41 reverse engineers will hardly have a free ride. Nor will the deci-
sion facilitate massive infringement resulting from the labors of reverse
engineers who will cleverly mask their copying by rearranging the code.
First, decompilation for many programs is technically difficult and
costly. Reverse engineering cannot be used by just any aspiring pi-
rate.4 Second, the decompilation task may become even more costly as
software owners employ self help (lock out) techniques to render ideas
and trade secrets embodied in their programs more secure. In response
to a threat of reverse engineering, software owners may increase their
efforts by placing both legal and technological hurdles in the path of
those trying to understand the function of their program. Companies
will engage in technological strategies to render the task of reverse en-
gineering more costly. One might view these technological hurdles as
merely another device used by businesses to protect their proprietary
information. Accordingly, software developers will erect barriers to pro-
tect both the ideas embodied in the program and the accompanying
proprietary information concerning valuable trade secrets embedded in
the code.4 s
If Sega results in attempts by manufacturers to hinder reverse en-
gineering, then consumer welfare will suffer. Security comes at a
41. The procedural context of the case renders the decision somewhat more narrow than it
is at first blush. The Sega court vacated a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court,
as a matter of law, had misapplied the four factor fair use test. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1521-28. The
court rejected a blanket rule permitting copying. After all, fair use must be decided on a case-by-
case basis, leaving future litigants to distinguish their cases by more clearly establishing hardships
pointing in their favor. Moreover, Sega is the rule in the Ninth Circuit only, and even the
Nintendo case decided by the Federal Circuit based its decision on Ninth Circuit law. Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Both Atari and Sega
analyzed fair use solely in the context of the four factors recited in § 107. But as the statute itself
states, and as Sega recognized, these statutory factors are not exclusive because fair use is an
equitable rule of reason. Although both courts held there was fair use, the tortuous manner in
which each court analyzed the four factors (and only those factors), coupled with the relatively
narrow holdings, raises the question whether a future court, presented with facts differing only
slightly from those in Atari and Sega, will recognize a fair use defense. Both courts identified the
problem inherent in the argument that copyright includes a right to preclude decompilation.
42. See generally Johnson-Laird, supra note 14.
43. As David Friedman has stated: "If copying is difficult and expensive, intellectual prop-
erty protection may be unnecessary." See David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property:
An Economic Approach, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1109 (1994). As a corollary, when certain forms
of intellectual property protection are unavailable, owners of information will if possible try to
render copying more difficult.
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price." To confront the liberated decompiler, computer software manu-
facturers may be encouraged to invest in elaborate and wasteful secur-
ity methods to control access to their products. Manufacturers may
write the sensitive parts of their code in a manner which renders disas-
sembly more difficult or makes the disassembled code more difficult to
understand. 5 If more resources are invested in security, the costs of
production will rise for both the software owner and those attempting
to gain access to the program through decompilation. These costs will
be passed on to the consumer. Apart from the effect on consumer wel-
fare, the Sega case will further encourage the use of self-help techno-
logical hurdles (such as the very lock-out devices in Sega) to impede
reverse engineering.
In addition to these technological hurdles, companies will make
renewed efforts to bind prospective licensees, and others, by contractual
means, to discourage dissemination of the underlying functioning of the
program. These contractual provisions, already common in the indus-
try, will become ever more popular after Sega. In this way, the result
of Sega may well be a rise in transaction costs for both users and pro-
ducers, thereby undercutting the pro-access policy the court so strongly
advocated.4' Thus, legal and technological inpediments will restrict ac-
cess to the underlying ideas and structures of the program which are
necessary to develop compatible or non-infringing programs and will
increase the costs of production for all concerned. It is difficult to mea-
sure whether these costs will outweigh the benefits of accelerated cu-
mulative innovation that Sega encourages. 7 Whether these attempts
will constitute copyright misuse (a method of extending the grant of
copyright beyond permissible limits) must be examined in relation to
underlying policies of copyright law.
44. Sometimes that price is too high. So if denial of legal protection will result in the pro-
ducer substituting equally effective or more costly alternatives, costs of non-protection outweigh
the costs of protection under copyright or patent. For the economics of trade secrets, see David
Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991).
45. See Bob Edgar, Shielded Code: How to Protect Your Proprietary Code From Disas-
semblers, COMPUTER LANGUAGE, June 1991, at 65-71. Companies may also be induced to reward
official licensees by changing the program in ways which would exclude unofficial licensees from
the latest version of the base unit.
46. This is the opposite of what one would normally expect. One argument against confer-
ring property rights on intellectual property is that costs of transactions are raised when a user
must negotiate with the copyright owner. As David Friedman has pointed out, these costs are
significant when there are multiple owners or the rights are vaguely defined. See Friedman, supra
note 43. But in the computer software field the opposite may occur when software owners use
contractual methods to raise the costs of access to the information in question.
47. One possible result of increased compatible products is that companies would try to
raise the initial cost of the base unit rather than wait to obtain their profits through the sale of
cartridges.
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III. COPYRIGHT MISUSE AND COMPETITIVE POLICY
A. Misuse Generally
The misuse defense began as an affirmative defense to a suit for
patent infringement based upon failure to pay royalties due under a
patent licensing agreement. In patent law, the misuse defense was de-
veloped as a means to prevent patent owners from using the market
power in their patents to restrain competition in other unpatented prod-
ucts through tie-ins and other restrictive licensing arrangements."8 The
Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit summarized the doctrine of
patent misuse as follows: "The concept of patent misuse arose to re-
strain practices that did not in themselves violate any law, but that
drew anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and thus were
deemed to be contrary to public policy."' 9
The policy behind the doctrine arises from the limited scope of the
monopoly granted to an inventor in return for the public's receipt of the
benefits of an invention. The defense was designed to create a balance
between the incentives created by the patent system, and constraints on
the patentee from using that power to extend the monopoly beyond the
specific terms of the grant. For example, in the leading case Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger,50 the Supreme Court refused to enforce
plaintiff's patent for a salt tablet dispensing machine used in the can-
ning industry, because the plaintiff conditioned the lease of its patented
machines on use of unpatented salt tablets produced by plaintiff's sub-
sidiary. The Court found misuse because plaintiff was attempting to
extend its exclusive right beyond the scope of the patent grant by at-
tempting to use his power in the market for the patented machine to
leverage the salt market. Whether this competitive effect did or could
have occurred is a matter of debate. The case, however, illustrates the
per se nature of the misuse doctrine.
The misuse defense can be viewed as an equitable "unclean
hands" defense. 51 When successfully asserted, the patent misuse de-
48. For a laundry list of practices that constitute patent misuse see generally, SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 814 (2d ed.
1992); see also Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 641 (1984) (discussion of
patent misuse); A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and
Metamorphosis, 44 PITT. L. REV. 73 (1982); Note, Vertical Territorial Restrictions as Patent
Misuse, 61 CAL. L. REV. 215 (1987).
49. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipark, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
50. 314 U.S. 488 (1988). See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944) (the other landmark case in patent misuse). Although Suppiger and Mercoid are regarded
as the critical cases in launching the doctrine, they can trace their origins to an earlier case,
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1917).
51. A good example of the equitable nature of the misuse defense occurred in Atari where
Atari had asserted misuse against Nintendo's licensing agreements that contained certain tie-out
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fense will prevent patent enforcement and the award of a remedy for
infringement.6 Once misuse is found, a patentee found guilty of the
misuse may not enforce the patent against infringers until the misuse
has been discontinued and its harmful effects have been eliminated.53
Moreover, the consequences of a positive finding of misuse may extend
beyond the parties to the suit. An individual defendant raising a patent
misuse defense need not show he was personally harmed by the abusive
practice.5
The policy justification for the misuse doctrine is based on the lim-
ited monopoly right conferred on patentees "to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States."55
The misuse doctrine is derived from a basic assumption that the patent
monopoly is restrictive on a free economy. The doctrine is applied be-
cause of a perceived necessity and a deeply ingrained perception about
the patent system. The goal of the doctrine is to prevent the patent
holder from extending benefits not contemplated by the grant through
use of such competitively suspect activities as tie-ins56 and exclusive
dealing arrangements. Although it governs competitive practices ad-
dressed by the antitrust laws, the misuse defense has retained a sepa-
rate identity, albeit uncertain.
B. The Misuse Defense as Distinct From Antitrust Law
Although it is based on principles of free competition, the misuse
doctrine has an identity distinct from antitrust laws. Most courts have
declared that the misuse defense does not require proof of an antitrust
clauses. The tie-out provisions conditioned the license of its lock out program on the licensee's
agreement not to produce games for any other home video system for two years after the first sale
of any Nintendo-compatible game. The court declared that because the misuse defense is equita-
ble, it could only be asserted by one with clean hands. Atari, however, did not have clean hands
because it had misled the Copyright Office to procure a copy of Nintendo's registered program; it
could not assert the defense. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
52. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04 (1993).
53. B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
54. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1988).
56. A tie-in is a form of misuse or antitrust violation in which the license or purchase of
item A is conditioned on the license or purchase of separate item B. This can be a violation of the
Clayton Act or the Sherman Act or constitute misuse of intellectual property that will deny relief
in an infringement suit. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). Acco-
lade based its unsuccessful misuse defense on unnamed tying allegations. Sega Enters., Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
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violation.5 7 This has made the misuse doctrine extremely attractive to a
defendant in a patent dispute. By asserting misuse, a defendant may
circumvent certain difficult aspects of proving an antitrust violation. In
general, to prove an antitrust violation, one must show conduct consti-
tuting a restraint of trade that would unreasonably harm competition
in a relevant market.58 But neither proof of market power, nor competi-
tive injury is necessary to prove misuse.5 9 In addition to proving market
power, an antitrust claimant must meet a standing requirement that
requires proof of injury "of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendant's acts un-
lawful." 60 Proof of standing is not required to prove patent misuse. A
defendant in an infringement action is shielded from suit if he can
show patent misuse, even though the acts of misuse neither constitute
competitive injury nor indicate that the plaintiff was individually
harmed by the defendant's misuse.6 Thus, a successful misuse defense
can bar enforcement of a copyright or patent, despite that conduct's
tangential relationship to the infringement action.
There are other differences between misuse and an antitrust viola-
tion. An antitrust violation is a counterclaim giving rise to damages,
whereas misuse is an absolute defense to an allegation of patent or
copyright infringement.62 Further, an alleged infringer cannot avoid
paying damages for engaging in infringing activities by counter claim-
ing under the antitrust laws. By contrast, the defendant in a misuse
claim must prove only that the plaintiff has extended his property right
beyond the patent or copyright."
57. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969); see
also Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Alaska 1965) (finding patent
misuse, but not an antitrust violation).
58. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Patent Misuse
Reform Act of 1988 (PMRA) now requires that defendants alleging patent misuse prove market
power in tying cases.
59. Sieffhart, 803 F.2d at 661.
60. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 419 U.S. 104, 109 (1986); see also Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
61. See generally Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. 100; Laitram Corp., 245 F. Supp. 1019.
62. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1988).
63. Despite these differences, some. courts do not clearly make the distinction between mis-
use and antitrust violations. For example, in Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. v. Don-
nelley Info. Publishing Corp., Donnelley alleged that Bellsouth had overextended its copyright by
restricting competing directory companies from using the factual information in its yellow pages.
719 F. Supp. 1551, 1562-63 (S.D. Fla. 1988), rev'd, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 943 (interim ed. 1994). The court declined to apply the misuse doctrine in this copy-
right infringement action, because it found that Bellsouth had not overextended its copyright and,
therefore, there was no antitrust violation. Id.
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The patent misuse doctrine has received sharp criticism from com-
mentators and industry groups.64 Because the misuse doctrine is based
on vague principles that overlap antitrust law, it is said to reduce the
incentive to innovate while discouraging pro-competitive licensing prac-
tices that disseminate patented technology. The misuse doctrine, dis-
tinct from antitrust principles, has had some supporters. For example,
Robert Merges asserts that an equitable doctrine preventing unfair ex-
tensions of patents (such as the misuse doctrine), offsets other pro-pat-
entee doctrines that effectively extend patents, such as the doctrine of
equivalents.65 In other words, a doctrine such as patent misuse is
needed to temper the natural tendency of patent owners for extending
the proper boundaries of their highly exclusionary grant. Nonetheless,
one can find in the literature little enthusiasm for the misuse doctrine.
In late 1988, legislation almost terminated the patent misuse de-
fense by prohibiting a finding of patent misuse unless the patentee's
practices violated the antitrust laws. The ultimate version of this legis-
lation produced a compromise amendment to the patent law. The mis-
use amendment incorporated rule of reason analysis for misuse when
the patentee refuses to license a patent or conditions the license of the
patent on the licensee's purchase of another product.66 With this
amendment, drafted in response to persistent criticism of the misuse
doctrine, the doctrine of patent misuse, independent of antitrust law, is
of questionable viability. 7 The doctrine of patent misuse is not dead
and a possibility exists that it may again flourish. Whatever the post-
amendment status of patent misuse, Congress apparently wished to go
no further, leaving untouched the corresponding doctrine of copyright
misuse. The legislative history, however, is ambiguous. Statements in
the record of the misuse amendment indicate that while the amend-
64. See Byron Bilicki, Standard Antitrust Analysis and Doctrine of Patent Misuse: A Uni-
fication Under the Rule of Reason, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 209 (1984); Richard Stitt, Copyright
Self-Help Protection as Copyright Misuse: Finally the Other Shoe Drops, 57 UMKC L. REV.
899 (1989); Thomas M. Susman, Tying, Refusals to License, and Copyright Misuse: The Patent
Misuse Model, 36 J. COPYRIGHT LAW SOC'Y 300 (1989).
65. See Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70
J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 793 (1988).
66. The Rule of Reason applies "unless . . . the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned." 5
U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988).
67. The demise of the misuse doctrine in patent law is consistent with current trends in
antitrust law to view licensing restrictions without the jaundiced eye of yesteryear. In the early
1970s the Justice Department issued the famous nine "no no's" constituting illegal licensing prac-
tices. These licensing practices that the Justice Department considered to be per se illegal under
the antitrust laws were substantially similar to practices held to constitute misuse. In the 1980s,
the Justice Department took a 180-degree turn in its attitude toward antitrust scrutiny of licensing
arrangements, finding previously considered per se violations to be generally pro-competitive.
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ment should not affect existing copyright law, the misuse defense has
even less of a rationale in copyright than in patent law.6 8
C. The Lasercomb Case and Copyright Misuse
Whereas the misuse defense has had a rich but troubled tradition
in patent law, misuse has been given little recognition in copyright law.
Allegations of copyright misuse have rarely succeeded. Even though the
defense has been acknowledged in several cases,6 9 no Supreme Court
decision has firmly established a copyright misuse defense analogous to
patent misuse. In fact, before the Lasercomb case, only one court had
actually relied on the misuse defense to prevent enforcement of a valid
copyright against infringers.70
Considering the tradition against the misuse defense in copyright
law, the Fourth Circuit decision in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reyn-
olds,7 1 is significant. Finally, a Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of
misuse to a copyright case. Lasercomb was a software licensor who in-
cluded, in at least one license agreement, a restrictive covenant which
precluded licensees from participating, in any manner, in the develop-
ment of competitive software for ninety-nine years. The court discussed
the history of both patent misuse and copyright misuse and concluded:
[t]he similarity of the policies underlying patent and copyright is great
and historically has been consistently recognized. Both patent law and
copyright law seek to increase the store of human knowledge and arts by
rewarding inventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their works
for a limited time. At the same time, the granted monopoly power does
not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright. 2
Equating the patent monopoly with that of copyright is questionable,
but Lasercomb is unequivocal on the full application of the misuse doc-
trine to copyright law.
The question after Lasercomb is whether copyright misuse can be
asserted against a software owner that uses contractual or technological
impediments to reverse engineering. In other words, to what extent can
68. See 133 CONG. REC. S10352-53 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (statements of Senators
DeConcini and Hatch).
69. See, e.g., United Tel. Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir.
1988); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400 (9th
Cir. 1986); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment
* Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley
Info. Publishing, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law,
Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357 (D. Del. 1980).
70. W. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
71. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 976.
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copyright owners employ self help attempts to undercut the benefits of
the fair use privilege? This kind of contractual restriction or technolog-
ical hurdle differs from the arrangements deemed to constitute copy-
right misuse in Lasercomb because they are not attempts to extend the
duration of the grant. Under Sega's anti-monopoly rationale, however,
such restricting may be construed as an attempt to circumvent a right
of access necessary for reverse engineers to exercise effectively the fair
use privilege. Although Accolade raised other misuse claims without
success, it did not assert that the technological lock-out devices used by
Sega constituted copyright misuse.73 This comes as a paradox: if one
accepts the premises of Sega's anti-monopoly underpinnings, Sega's
self-help technological lock out techniques may have constituted the
strongest claim for copyright misuse.7 4
D. Contractual and Technological Methods to Impede Reverse
Engineering
Contractual provisions restricting reverse engineering are the most
obvious and traditional method to obstruct reverse engineering. They
are quite common and are found in both negotiated licenses and those
characterized as "shrink wrap licenses." Setting aside the enforceabil-
ity of shrink wrap licenses,1 5 the logic of Sega may encourage misuse
arguments as a defense to copyright infringement. As such, these con-
tractual provisions may plausibly be construed as attempts to unduly
extend the grant of copyright by preventing access to uncopyrightable
ideas. Contractual provisions may be viewed in Sega language as an
attempt to preclude public access to functional elements in the work
and to confer a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional
concepts.76
73. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). Like Sega, misuse was also asserted without
success in Atari. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Similarly, Atari did not raise a misuse defense for Nintendo's lock-out devices. Id.
74. See Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of
Computer Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J., 25,
65 (1993) (Professor McManis argues that Sega's anti-monopoly rhetoric suggests that Sega's use
of the lock out devices constituted a misuse of copyright).
75. See generally, David Einhorn, The Enforceability of "Tear Me Open" Software License
Agreements, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 509 (1985); Gary W. Hamilton and Jeffrey C.
Hood, The Shrink-Wrap License - Is It Really Necessary?, 10 COMPUTER LAWYER 16 (Aug.
1993); see also Vault v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (certain provisions of
shrink wrap license were preempted by Copyright Act). For a comprehensive overview of the
subject see David A. Rice, Private Contract, Public Goods, and Public Policy: Federal Preemp-
tion of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543
(1992).
76. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
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As an alternative to relying on a contractual provision to prevent
purchasers or licensees from reverse engineering, a software vendor
could try to achieve the same results by technological means, incorpo-
rating into the software a routine to preclude or impede copying. Tech-
nological self help (or lock-out) methods, if successful, raise entry bar-
riers to potential competitors by increasing costs of reverse engineering.
Under an expansive misuse rationale, there is no reason why this con-
duct should be treated any differently than a contractual prohibition on
copying since the purpose and result would be the same. Technological
methods would, in Sega's terms, defeat the purpose of the Copyright
Act. The Act is designed to encourage the production of original works
by protecting the expressive elements of those works while leaving the
ideas, facts, and functional concepts in the public domain for others to
build on." Technological hurdles may be viewed as impoverishing the
public and depriving access to those wishing to use the essential build-
ing blocks needed to produce compatible or other non-infringing works.
As with the contractual prohibition, the first issue under copyright law
is whether the technical impediment prevents the purchasers or licen-
sees from doing something they would otherwise be able to do under
the fair use doctrine. If so, copyright misuse might be a plausible de-
fense. Although the misuse argument may have an attractive surface
appeal, a full-blown recognition of the misuse defense is ill-fitted to
copyright law and would play havoc with the commercial realities of
the computer software industry.
A misuse defense recognized in copyright law would undermine
many of the current licensing practices existing in the software indus-
try, thus causing uncertainty in commercial relationships. Computer
software licenses are often drafted to protect both copyright and trade
secrets embodied in the same program. These licenses almost invariably
prohibit the licensee from copying the program, or reverse engineering
it, to obtain a form accessible to human comprehension. Moreover, the
licenses do not distinguish between the copyrighted expression and un-
copyrighted ideas of the work. The reason is a practical one: No tech-
nologically feasible way to separate these two rights exists. As dis-
cussed above, it is impossible to gain access to the unprotected elements
of a program without simultaneously copying the protected elements as
well. Here, one might argue that the copyright owner is trying to lever-
age the copyright beyond the terms of the grant and has thus commit-
ted copyright misuse. Such arguments, however, do not recognize the
highly integrated nature of computer software. In addition, these argu-
77. Id.
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ments improperly equate the strength of the copyright monopoly with
that of the patent monopoly.
Using technological restraints that would restrict reproduction
cannot be limited to the copyrightable expression embodied in the code.
Moreover, these restraints are specifically designed to keep others from
copying the ideas embodied in the work-ideas that often constitute
valuable trade secrets, developed at great expense. In addition to breed-
ing uncertainty into commercial relationships, full-blown recognition of
copyright misuse would amount to an enforced disclosure of the expres-
sive aspects of the work and could well lead to the destruction of trade
secret rights.
E. Copyright Misuse as Enforced Disclosure
The essential question is whether a misuse defense would benefit
consumer welfare by promoting the optimal production and dissemina-
tion of computer works. My conclusion is that such a turn would con-
stitute an unfortunate development in the law that would risk under-
mining the goals of copyright law. To reinvigorate a misuse defense in
copyright law would upset the delicate balance between the incentive to
create works of authorship and the dissemination function of copyright
as embodied in the fair use doctrine. A misuse defense extended to
efforts of software owners to impede reverse engineering would amount
to a policy of de facto enforced disclosure of the software, including the
trade secrets embodied in it. Some have vigorously maintained that dis-
closure of the expression and ideas embodied in software should be a
prerequisite for copyright protection. Dennis Karjala, and others,7 8
have argued that total disclosure of all aspects of computer software is
a quid pro quo mandated by section 102(b) of the Act and by constitu-
tional fiat. This goes too far. Nothing in the Copyright Act or the Con-
stitution mandates disclosure. Section 102(b) 9 of the Act forbids copy-
right protection for certain aspects of expressive works but does not
require access be provided for these unprotectable elements. Whatever
the merits of the argument favoring disclosure, achieving disclosure
through an invigorated copyright misuse defense is improper. Recogni-
tion of misuse in these circumstances would have a perverse economic
effect on the production and distribution of commercial software. En-
forced disclosure would often strip the program of its economic worth
and discourage software developers from producing new works.
78. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engi-
neering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975 (1994); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable
Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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Perhaps the most serious result of enforced disclosure through a
misuse defense would be an undermining of the relationship between
the copyrightable subject matter and the trade secrets embodied in the
object code.80 Although the interplay of trade secret and copyright re-
mains an area in limbo, both the courts"1 and the Copyright Office
have proclaimed that the two forms of intellectual property are not mu-
tually exclusive. To assure protection of proprietary information, the
Copyright Office has established special procedures in their deposit re-
quirements for software bearing trade secrets.82 Moreover, trade secret
rights are not ipso facto preempted by the Copyright Act.83 Very often
trade secrets coexist in a software program and constitute the most val-
uable aspect of the program. 4 Although trade secrets, are basically
ideas and cannot be protected under copyright law, they can be pro-
tected by contract or other means, thus protecting them from improper
appropriation. 5
If the misuse defense is used to effectively impede efforts of
software owners to protect their trade secrets, either by licenses or
technological security devices, the result will impose a heavy burden on
the software owner. If software owners hesitate in disseminating their
work for fear of losing their trade secrets the result may be harm to
consumer welfare. Increased trade secret vulnerability would raise the
cost of producing the software. Higher costs would either be passed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices or would force non-produc-
tion of some works.
IV. CONCLUSION
Full recognition of the copyright misuse defense as applied by ef-
forts of software owners to impede reverse engineering would be an
unfortunate development. It would be a paradox if the misuse defense
were engrafted into copyright law after Congress has virtually termi-
80. Leslie Wharton, Misuse and Copyright: a Legal Mismatch, 8 COMPUTER LAWYER 1
(March 1991).
81. See GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); see also Technicon
Medical Info. Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982) (copyright
notice does not estop a copyright owner from asserting trade secret rights).
82. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.20-.21 (1990).
83. Brinoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
84. See FINDING A BALANCE, supra note 13, at 82.
85. A trade secret may be defined as "any information that can be used in the operation of
a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others." RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (Tent.
Draft #4 Mar. 25, 1993). Numerous court cases have protected trade secrets in computer
software. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
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nated the misuse defense as a viable doctrine in patent law.86 There
exist even fewer reasons to extend misuse principles to copyright law.
Historically, courts have been less inclined to sanction the misuse de-
fense in copyright infringement cases than in patent cases. This posi-
tion -rests on a fundamental difference between the patent and copy-
right grants. A copyright, even more so than a patent, is a legal rather
than an economic monopoly.87 The rationale for the misuse defense is
even weaker in copyright law, since the exclusionary force of the mo-
nopoly is less than in patent law. Persons create copyrighted works hop-
ing to charge supracompetitve prices for the work. This can only result
if consumers are willing to pay the supracompetitive price instead of
seeking satisfactory substitutes. If these substitutes are available, the
seller of the work will enjoy no economic power in the market for the
work. Generally, works of computer software are (as is the case for
most copyrighted works) highly substitutable."8 Dozens of software pro-
grams may compete at any one time for the consumer's dollars. Al-
though copyright law may prohibit copying, this constraint in itself
does not necessarily lead to market power. As a result, the copyright
grant will not confer the degree of market power that the patent grant
confers and that the patent misuse cases presuppose. 89 For this reason,
claims that the copyright owner has sought to extend his copyright be-
yond its proper scope have fallen on deaf ears. Courts have properly
looked to antitrust law as the sole regulator of anti-competitive con-
duct. Judge Posner has aptly characterized the misuse doctrine in pat-
ent law: "If misuse principles are not tested by conventional antitrust
principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich
in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse and it is rather late in the
day to develop one without subjecting the rights of patent holders to
debilitating uncertainty."' 0 Adoption of the misuse doctrine in copy-
right law would breed uncertainty in the delicate allocation of property
86. Legislative history indicates that the patent misuse reform should not affect existing
copyright law, but the statements of legislators advocate the complete elimination of the "vague
and tenuous" doctrine of copyright misuse. See 133 CONG. REC. S10275 (daily ed. July 21, 1987)
(statements of Senators DeConcini and Hatch).
87. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1198-1200 (7th
Cir. 1987).
88. See Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1119, 1128 (1986).
89. Even in the case of patents, most economists have agreed that few of the thousands of
patents granted every year truly confer economic power. See F. Sherer & D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCe 622 (1990).
90. USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1107 (1983).
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rights and contractual arrangements governing a complex and ever
changing computer software industry.
